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ABSTRACT
Information resources seem to be neither fully abstract uni-
versals, nor particular concrete arrangements of matter and
energy. The subjects of our metadata statements are there-
fore elusive. This puzzle presents few practical problems
for traditional documents, but applications such as scientific
data management call for more precise accounts. The prob-
lem of relating fully abstract properties to events in time is
explored through a comparison of encoding strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
What kind of thing can have an author? Obviously, a work
of authorship, but what kind of thing is that? For a long time
there have been two candidates for what, precisely, infor-
mation resources are: fully abstract universals (e.g., symbol
sequences, graphs, trees, relations, automata) or particular
concrete arrangements of matter and energy (on paper, mag-
netic tape, in fiber optic cable, etc). But our usual intuitions
about identity, location, and provenance of resources make
either account problematic. An information object cannot
be identified exclusively with any one of the patterned mat-
ter/energy bundles that embodies it. But unlike abstract uni-
versals, information resources are anchored to creation and
modification events in time.
Indeed, the question of whether information objects are any
type of thing at all depends on key relationships between
abstract universals and contingent facts. Consider, for ex-
ample, a binary file’s encoding of a digital image. Strictly
speaking, the property of encoding some particular image is
not necessary to that sequence of bits, but contingent on in-
terpretations that guide the execution of computer software.
Categories such as “TIFF,” “JPEG,” or “digital image file,”
would therefore seem to be roles played by fully abstract
sequences, rather than types in their own right (Guarino &
Welty, 2000). Similar arguments apply to bibliographic en-
tities such as the expression of a work of authorship or the
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manifestation of a text (Renear & Dubin, 2007).
Certain physical objects offer a useful analogy: some partic-
ular sheet of paper, for example, will have essential proper-
ties, such as being made of paper, and may instantiate cer-
tain non-essential properties, like being folded into a toy air-
plane. If paper airplanes simply are sheets of paper folded in
particular ways then (following Guarino and Welty) it may
seem at first that the property of being a paper airplane is not
strictly a type (such as “person”) but a role (like “student” or
“customer”). But from another point of view one can under-
stand paper airplanes as a category of physical object having
both shape and material as essential properties. So the prop-
erty of deltry shape, or dart shape can be essential to the toy
airplane, even if it’s not essential to the sheet of paper.
TEMPORAL, BUT NOT SPATIO-TEMPORAL
There are phenomena which, unlike paper airplanes, have
no particular physical locus for their properties, and these fit
comfortably in neither the category of concrete particulars
nor the category of abstract universals. Documents are one
example, along with musical composition (Levinson, 1990),
promises (Searle, 1999), and games of chess (Smith, 2008).
On the one hand, they don’t exist necessarily the way that
the number twelve exists in every logically possible world.
One can always imagine a possible world in which the mu-
sical work was never composed, the promise never pledged,
or the game of chess never played. On the other hand, works
of authorship, art, etc. are not bounded in space the way
that particular physical objects are. Rather, they seem an-
chored in some crucial way to particular events in time (acts
of composition, borrowing, etc.).
Just as documents can be identified with abstract strings and
trees, so the other resources can be identified with one or
more categories of abstract objects. One can believe, for ex-
ample, that musical works simply are abstract sound patterns
or that chess games are nothing more or less than sequences
of abstract moves consistent with the rules of the game. On
those understandings, works of authorship and art are not
truly created by people, but merely discovered, and this is
one of several consequence of of the views that some may
consider counterintuitive. Abstract objects have no intrinsic
non-essential properties So if a textual document is simply
an abstract string of characters, it will have the property of a
particular length. But it will not, except accidentally, have:
1. the property of being a document
Figure 1. Excerpt from Hale online notebook
2. the property being in a particular language (such as En-
glish)
3. a document genre (such as being a business letter or novel)
4. the property of belonging to an era in time, such as the
17th century
And so on. Similarly, if an XML document really is an
abstract tree of nodes, then it can have the property of be-
ing acyclic intrinsically, but not the property of being valid
against a schema or conforming to well-formedness require-
ments. If a JPEG file is only an abstract stream of bits, then
it won’t have the property of being a JPEG, encoding a par-
ticular image, and so on.
If documents and other information resources are abstract
objects like strings, trees, and graphs, then most of the as-
sertions we make about them in encoded descriptions are,
strictly speaking, true of nothing. That’s not to say that they
are false assertions, but that there is no thing which has the
attributed property essentially. But what, if any, practical
problem does that present for information modeling and dig-
ital representation? Ascriptions of extrinsic properties such
as weight, assigned identification numbers, and home ad-
dresses have always been part of information systems. It’s
not immediately clear how the extrinsic character of these
ascriptions is cause for concern.
Indeed, for nearly all the familiar database and document
indexing applications, extrinsic property ascription present
no serious problem at all. Even if having been authored is
not the kind of property that a bit string, character string, or
ordered hierarchy could have, acting as if it were the case
does nothing to complicate the retrieval of a bibliographic
record—quite the opposite! But we’ve begun to see a need
for software support of more demanding forms of informa-
tion management that call for more precise accounts. We
take up one such application in the next section.
A RESEARCH DATA SET EXAMPLE
In the remainder of this paper we relate the issues exam-
ined to one particular encoding problem: the translation of a
small scientific data set from a spreadsheet format into RDF.
The encoding exercise is part of an ongoing Data Conser-
vancy project funded by the National Science Foundation’s
Office of Cyberinfrastructure1. The project’s broader goals
are to improve support for collecting and sharing data pro-
duced by individual scientists and research groups. This par-
ticular formalization exercise is not intended to produce en-
coding guidelines or tools for information exchange2, but
only to explore basic concepts of what scientific data is.
Specifically, we seek to bridge the levels of data content
(numbers, strings), data structure (e.g., cases, variables) and
research transactions (experimentation, documentation, etc.).
The data selected for this exercise were published on the
Worldwide Web as part of the Open Notebook Science Chal-
lenge3. They record solubility measurements for three com-
pounds in each of three different solvents, and (like other lab
notebook entries) include observation event details at a level
not available for most of the data sets used in our project.
These data are therefore well suited for exploring concepts
at a level presumed to be a basis in those data sets that do
not record transactions directly. Figure 2 shows part of an
1http://cirss.lis.illinois.edu/SciCom/DataConservancy.html
2Compare, for example, the OBOE ontology (Madin et al., 2007).
3http://onschallenge.wikispaces.com/JennyHale-12
Figure 2. example from Hale 2009 spreadsheet data
online spreadsheet linked from the log, containing the data
we propose to encode.
We begin with a naı¨ve, straightforward RDF translation, where
each row of the table (i.e., each experimental sample) is
deemed an object, and table columns are interpreted as prop-
erties. The results of translating one of the rows is shown
below.
<rdf:Description
rdf:about="ns0:JHale-12#sample3"
ns1:Appearance_after_3_hours="Yellowy-
green and black crystalline"
ns1:Concentration_(M)="0.075615937512984"
ns1:Mass_of_Tube_+_solid_(g)="1.0058"
ns1:Mass_of_empty_eppendorf_(g)="0.9965"
ns1:Mass_of_solid_in_500_uL_(mg)="9.1"
ns1:RMM_of_solid="240.69"
ns1:Sensible_concentration_(M)="0.076"
ns1:Solid="10-chloro-9-anthraldehyde"
ns1:Solvent="THF"
ns1:Subsequent_mass_1_(g)="1.0056"
ns1:Subsequent_mass_2_(g)="missing_value"
ns1:mMSolidIn500uL="0.037807968756492"/>
Although simple and direct, the resulting description is a
digital chimera. It suggests an object that has, e.g., a rel-
ative molecular mass of 240.69, the property of being the
solvent Tetrahydrofuran, and a “Mass of empty eppendorf”
property. Clearly different objects and their properties have
been confounded in the same description.
Given sufficient time and care, it would be possible to iden-
tify each physical object and create a separate description
for its properties. The Semantic Interoperability Community
of Practice (SICoP) publishes a Common Semantic Model
(COSMO) ontology4 which includes classes and properties
that can support a first attempt:
<cosmo:Container
rdf:about="ns0:JHale-12#s3Tube"
cosmo:hasMassInGrams="0.9965"/>
4http://semanticommunity.wik.is/
<cosmo:ContainerAndContents
rdf:about="ns0:JHale-12#s3Tube+solid"
cosmo:hasMassInGrams="1.0058"/>
<cosmo:AnalyticalSample
rdf:about="ns0:JHale-12#s3solid"
ns1:Appearance_after_3_hours="Yellowy-
green and black crystalline"
cosmo:hasMassInGrams="0.0091"/>
And so on. Some drawbacks to this second approach are
more obvious than others. It’s very tedious to identify and
describe each particular object that can be discriminated by
its properties. In the current example, nine solutions are pre-
pared, but each solvent/solid combination can arguably be
understood as three distinct objects (each with a different
mass), rather than a single object that changes over time as
the last of the solvent evaporates. Understanding containers
with their contents as objects distinct from either one gives
us still more work to do.
Another drawback to the second approach is more subtle: by
focusing exclusively on physical objects and their properties
we risk throwing away a great deal of revealing structure that
is key to the data’s interpretation. For example, many of the
mass and molarity measurements in the spreadsheet seem re-
dundant: one column’s values are a linear function of the val-
ues in one or more other columns, suggesting that they con-
tribute nothing new in an information theoretic sense. But
these redundancies are essential to document particular cal-
culations the experimenter has made over the data, and these
in turn help explain key relationships among the variables in
the study (mass, formula weight, and molar concentration,
for example).
We’d like to encode our description at a level that connects
fully abstract properties like masses and concentrations to
the transaction events at which times they were observed or
computed. Our descriptions should include measurements
and data values as entities, but what exactly are those? Are
they numbers? Classes of event? Statements in a language
of some kind? Can we express relationships between proper-
ties, measurement events, measurement units, numbers, and
numeral strings without creating chimeras of the kind we
saw in the first encoding attempt?
Ultimately we need to accommodate scenarios where de-
tailed transaction logs aren’t available, whether due to issues
of scale or to generations of post-processing and derivations
between the data set and the original recorded observations.
So rather than moving directly to another RDF description
of the molarity data, we begin with a set of terminological
axioms. The aim is to propose a high-level account of data
and data content that could govern knowledge structures ex-
pressed in RDFS or OWL. The aim is not only to clarify re-
lationships between non-repeating events and fully abstract
objects, but for those expressions to support limited infer-
ences about missing information, such as transaction events
for which no asserted record appears in the knowledge base.
Proposition ⊑ AbstractThing
SymbolStructure ⊑ AbstractThing
Obs ⊑ Event
Comp ⊑ Event
Assertion ⊑ Event
Claim ≡ Proposition ⊓ ∃substanceOf.Assertion
DataContent ≡ Claim ⊓ ∃supportedBy.(Obs⊔ Comp)
Datum ≡ SymbolStructure ⊓ ∃expresses.DataContent
By this account, a datum is an abstract symbol structure that
expresses data content. Data content is a claim for which
someone has cited one or more observation or computation
events as support. And a claim is a proposition that is the
substance of some agent’s assertion event. An ontology based
on axioms like these might govern an encoding like the one
below, where propositional content is explicitly linked to
provenance events.
<ns0:proposition
rdf:about="ns1:propJH999">
<ns0:subject
resource="ns1:JHale-12#s3solid"/>
<ns0:predicate
resource="cosmo:hasMassInGrams"/>
<ns0:object rdf:datatype=
"xsd:float">0.0091</ns0:object>
<ns0:substanceOf
resource="ns1:JHAssert19"/>
<ns0:supportedBy
resource="ns1:JHComput441"/>
</ns0:proposition>
Of course, the list of axioms is not complete: the figure
omits event agency properties, for example, inverse prop-
erties (e.g., has substance) and details of domain and range
constraints. But the three definitions of claim, data content,
and datum are the core of the proposal.
CONCLUSION
The definitions explored in the last example do not resolve
the the metaphysical puzzles with which we began the paper.
On this account, scientific data simply are a kind of abstract
symbol structure, and their content are a subset of fully ab-
stract propositions. The categories are extrinsic properties
based on contingent facts. So to say that a particular sym-
bol string “is” a datum is to ascribe a property that, strictly
speaking, abstract symbol structures don’t have. But we
need not read the biconditional operator as expressing strict
identity: a more appropriate gloss might be something like
“a string of symbols has data status, just in case. . . ” Such a
reading would be similar to Searle’s theory of social objects
or social facts (Smith & Searle, 2003).
By working toward a satisfying general account of scientific
data, we hope to inform the development of guidelines for
recording, description, and archival practice.
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